University of Washington School of Law

UW Law Digital Commons
Selected Articles

Washington State Constitution History

2022

Batting Two-for-Eleven: Tim Eyman's Initiatives and the
Washington Supreme Court
Taylor N. Larson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/selart
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Taylor N. Larson, Batting Two-for-Eleven: Tim Eyman's Initiatives and the Washington Supreme Court
(2022), https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/selart/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington State Constitution History at UW Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Selected Articles by an authorized administrator of UW Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Batting Two-for-Eleven:
Tim Eyman’s Initiatives and the Washington Supreme Court
Taylor N. Larson
December, 2022
Tim Eyman is a watch salesman by trade. 1 He has worn a gorilla suit in public outside the
Halloween season. 2 For a time, he was known to shout “hoo-ha” without prompting. 3
Nevertheless, Eyman claims to have saved Washingtonians $54.864 billion in taxes since 1999. 4
How? Via initiatives. Over the last twenty or so years, voters have approved Eyman-sponsored
initiatives to cut car tabs and cap property taxes. But in so doing, they have also approved a host
of other provisions in those initiatives, from requiring a referendum on any tax by the legislature
to tying the state’s tax calculations to the Kelley Blue Book.
These initiatives—and those tax “savings”—have caused some distress among good
government proponents. 5 But the merits of Eyman’s ideas aside, this much is clear after two
decades: As drafted in initiative form, his ideas usually run afoul of Washington’s Constitution.
Most of his initiatives have found their way to the Washington State Supreme Court, and once
there, the Court has usually struck them down. But there are some lessons in his losses about
how to draft a focused initiative, one limited in its purpose to what the courts will find
acceptable. What follows is an overview of those initiative cases, and how Washington’s law of
initiatives developed as a result.

Tomas Alex Tizon, Taking the Initiative Too Far?, Los Angeles Times, Apr. 22, 2003,
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-apr-22-na-ballotguy22-story.html.
2
Joel Connelly, Why Tim Eyman Should, at Last, Run for Public Office, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 5, 2013,
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/connelly/article/Why-Tim-Eyman-should-at-last-run-for-public-4327758.php
3
Tizon. For an example of this utterance, see Scent of a Woman (Universal Pictures 1992).
4
About Us – Permanent Offense, Permanent Offense, https://permanentoffense.com/about-us/.
5
See generally, Brewster C. Denny, Initiatives—Enemy of the Republic, 24 Seattle L. Rev. 1025 (2001).
1
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I. The Initiative Process
A. A Brief History of the Initiative in Washington
Washington, like other western states, adopted the initiative and referendum during the
Progressive Era of the early 20th Century. 6 Oregon adopted the initiative and referendum in
1902 7; California in 1911. 8 And in 1912, Washington’s voters approved an amendment to Article
II, § 1 of their State Constitution, “reserv[ing]” for themselves the initiative and referendum. 9 It
was not a close contest: The amendment passed by more than two-to-one. 10
And the initiative seems here to stay. In the years leading up to the 1912 amendment
vote, the liquor industry had fought direct democracy bitterly, arguing it would lead to a “dry”
Washington. 11 Sure enough, in 1914, Washington passed (among others measures) an initiative
“prohibiting the manufacture, sale or other disposition of intoxicating liquors.” 12 The legislature
responded by attempting to make signature gathering for initiatives far more onerous, but the
voters rejected that measure—by a forty-point margin—in Referendum 3. 13 And since 1912,
Washingtonians have voted on no less than 28 initiatives to the legislature 14 and 155 initiatives
6
See generally David S. Broder, Democracy Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the Power of Money 23–42 (2000).
For a contemporary discussion of the initiative at the turn of the last century, see generally James William Sullivan,
Direct Legislation by the Citizenship Through the Initiative and Referendum (1892).
7
Or. Const. art. IV, § I (1902).
8
Cal. Const. art. IV, § 1 (1911).
9
Wash. Off. of the Sec’y of State, Elections Search Results: November 1912 General,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/results_report.aspx?e=125&c=&c2=&t=&t2=5&p=&p2=&y=.
10
Id. (For: 110,110; Against: 43,905). See also Belas v. Kiga, 135 Wn.2d 913, 920, 959 P.2d 1037 (1998); Wash.
Fed’n of State Emp. v. State, 127 Wn.2d 544, 556, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995) (holding the people essentially act as the
legislature when they approve an initiative).
11
Norman Clark, “The Hell-Soaked Institution” and the Washington Prohibition Initiative of 1914, 56 Pac. Nw. Q.
1, 6 (1965). Liquor interests also opposed women’s suffrage for the same reason. See T.A. Larson, The Woman
Suffrage Movement in Washington, 67 Pac. Nw. Q. 49, 53 (1976).
12
Wash. Off. of the Sec’y of State, Elections Search Results: November 1914 General,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/results_report.aspx?e=123&c=&c2=&t=&t2=&p=&p2=&y=.
13
Wash. Off. of the Sec’y of State, Elections Search Results: November 1916 General,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/results_report.aspx?e=120&c=&c2=&t=&t2=5&p=&p2=&y= (For: 62,117;
Against: 196, 363). For the full text of Referendum 3, see Office of the Secretary of State, State of Washington,
1916 Voters’ Pamphlet, pp. 14–20, https://www2.sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/voters'%20pamphlet%201916.pdf.
14
Wash. Off. of the Sec’y of State, Yearly Summary of Initiatives to the Legislature,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/yearly-summary-of-initiatives-to-the-legislature.aspx.
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to the people 15. . . and approved, almost a century after the experiment with prohibition, an
initiative ending the state monopoly on the sale of hard liquor. 16
B. Signatures, Ballot Titles, and the Voters
Washington recognizes two kinds of initiatives: initiatives to the legislature and
initiatives to the people. 17 The latter are straightforward in theory: If a petitioner has drafted a
law he would like adopted, and gathers enough signatures, it goes to the voters. 18 Initiatives to
the legislature, as the name suggests, are sent to the legislature first (if, again, the petitioner has
the requisite signatures). The legislature may then adopt the initiative as written, reject it and
place it on the ballot for the voters, or adopt an alternative statute, in which case both the original
initiative and the legislature’s alternative are presented to the voters in the next election. 19
In practice, of course, the process is more involved. To begin, an initiative’s sponsor—a
registered Washington voter—must file a copy of the proposed measure with the Secretary of
State and pay a filing fee. 20 The proposed language is then sent to the office of the Code Reviser,
who may recommend revisions to the sponsor. 21 Whether or not the sponsor accepts those
recommendations, the Code Reviser certifies it has reviewed the measure, and if the sponsor still
wishes to proceed, he must send the measure (with any revisions) and certificate back to the
Secretary of State to receive a serial number. 22

15
Wash. Off. of the Sec’y of State, Yearly Summary of Initiatives to the People,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/yearly-summary-of-initiatives-to-the-people.aspx.
16
Wash. Off. of the Sec’y of State, November 08, 2011 General Election Results,
https://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20111108/initiative-measure-1183-concerning-liquor--beer-wine-and-spirits-hardliquor.html.
17
Wash. Const. art. II, § 1.
18
“[T]he number of valid signatures of legal voters required shall be equal to eight percent of the votes cast for the
office of governor at the last gubernatorial election . . . .” Id.
19
Id.
20
RCW 29A.72.010. For an initiative to the people, this filing must be within ten months of the next general
election. RCW 29A.72.030.
21
RCW 29A.72.020.
22
Id.
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Next, the Office of Financial Management (OFM) prepares a fiscal impact statement for
the initiative. 23 Additionally, as of this past June, initiatives that modify taxes or fees, or, based
on OFM’s assessment of the fiscal impact, “would cause a net change in state revenue,” are
subject to an additional “public investment impact disclosure” drafted by the Attorney General’s
Office (AGO). 24 This disclosure is then embedded in the ballot title, also drafted by AGO. 25 In
Washington, the format for a ballot title—the short explanation of the initiative given to
prospective signatories and, if there are enough of those, voters—is very prescriptive as of 2003:
“Initiative Measure No. . . . concerns (statement of subject). This measure would (concise
description). (Public investment impact disclosure, if applicable.) Should this measure be enacted
into law?” 26
After OFM, AGO, and the Code Reviser have discharged their duties, the sponsor is free
to gather signatures, provided his petitions are formatted properly. 27 He may even pay others to
gather signatures on his behalf. 28 If he gathers enough, and submits them to the Secretary of
State within four months of the next election (assuming an initiative to the people), the Secretary
of State will issue a certificate of sufficiency, and the measure will appear on the ballot. 29

RCW 29A.72.025.
RCW 29A.72.027. “The legislature finds that when exercising this right, the people are entitled to know the fiscal
impact that their vote will have on public investments at the time they cast their ballots. The legislature further finds
that when a ballot measure will affect funding for public investments, a neutral, nonprejudicial disclosure of the
public investments affected will provide greater transparency and necessary information for voters.” Wash. H.R.
Leg. Findings, Laws of 2022 Ch. 114.
25
RCW 29A.72.027; RCW 29A.72.060.
26
RCW 29A.72.050.
27
RCW 29A.72.100; RCW 29A.72.120. The size of and composition of the paper matters.
28
Washington’s prior ban on paid signature gatherers was struck down in Limit v. Maleng, 874 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D.
Wash. 1994). A legislative finding that the practice “encourages the introduction of fraud” remains on the books as
RCW 29A.84.280.
29
RCW 29A.72.160; RCW 29A.72.170; RCW 29A.72.250.
23
24
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C. Litigating Ballot Measures (and their Titles)
That process does court controversy from time to time, however. At several steps along
the way, the initiative sponsor and others can appeal a decision made by the state office
responsible for that step. Under the new public investment impact disclosure regime, a sponsor
who objects to the disclosure’s content has three days to make a direct appeal to the Thurston
County Superior Court. 30 That court’s decision is final. 31 If he objects to the content of the ballot
title and summary more broadly, he (or any other person) has five days to file an appeal in
Thurston County, where, again, the decision is final. 32 If his signature petitions are later rejected,
he has ten days to appeal in Thurston County. 33 If the grounds for rejection was an insufficient
number of signatures, any Washingtonian has five days to appeal . . . in Thurston County
Superior Court. 34 With respect to signature petitions only, if the Thurston County judge refuses
to grant a writ of mandate ordering the Secretary of State to accept the petitions, the Supreme
Court may review the case. 35 But for the most part, initiative litigation is a battle fought after the
initiative has passed, at which point the courts are “the sole institutional check on the initiative
process . . . .”—the legislature’s and governor’s hands are tied, at least for a few years after the
initiative is passed. 36

RCW 29A.72.028. One of Eyman’s chief objections to the original bill—which did not include an appeal
mechanism—is it would provide the Attorney General “the ability to influence voters and sabotage an initiative
without any recourse.” Wash. H.R. Bill Report, HB 1876, 4 (2022).
31
Id.
32
RCW 29A.72.080.
33
RCW 29A.72.180.
34
RCW 29A.72.240.
35
RCW 29A.72.200. “The review must be considered an emergency matter of public concern . . . .”
36
Kenneth P. Miller, Courts as Watchdogs of the Washington State Initiative Process, 24 Seattle L. Rev. 1053, 1055
(2001).
30
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II. Tim Eyman’s Initiatives
Seventeen Eyman-sponsored initiatives have appeared on a Washington State general
election ballot. 37 Six were rejected at the polls; two were approved with relatively little followup litigation; the rest made their way to the Washington Supreme Court. Although a few
provisions of those nine remaining initiatives are still good law, 38 the Supreme Court overturned
them all. These overturned initiatives (with a few a few exceptions or additional wrinkles in the
court’s reasoning) fall largely into two categories: initiatives that ran afoul of the State
Constitution’s single subject and subject-in-title requirements, 39 and a series of initiatives
attempting to impose an unconstitutional supermajority requirement on legislative tax
increases. 40 First, though, it is worth discussing Eyman’s two most durable initiatives.
A. Two Successes
1. 1998’s I-200 and Affirmative Action
Eyman’s first initiative was Initiative 200 (I-200) in 1998, pitched to voters as the
“Washington Civil Rights Act.” 41 Modeled after a similar measure California adopted a few
years prior, I-200 was designed to eliminate affirmative action in government hiring and public
university admissions. 42 After a hard-fought campaign, in which opponents from Governor Gary

See Appendix for a complete list, including the full text of ballot titles. Eyman has also sponsored numerous
initiatives that were either withdrawn or failed to secure enough signatures, as well as some local ballot measures.
The Washington Secretary of State maintains a record of every measure that receives a serial number.
38
See, e.g., Initiative 960 (I-960), requiring a nonbinding advisory vote on legislative tax increases, codified as
RCW 29.A.72.983 and discussed supra pp. [n].
39
Wash. Const. art. II, § 19.
40
Wash. Const. art. II, § 22.
41
See I-200 PAC, Washington Civil Rights Act—Equality for all, https://i200.org/.
42
Broder, 173–82. Broder attributed I-200’s success to Seattle radio host John Carlson, as well as the California
source material (Proposition 209) originally developed by businessman Ward Connerly in 1996.
37
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Locke to the Boeing Company spent over $1.5 million (to the “Yes” campaign’s $500,000), 43 I200 passed with roughly 58% of the vote. 44
I-200 was not challenged in the courts, apart from a failed attempt by the American Civil
Liberties Union to modify the ballot title. 45 And it remains the law in Washington in
substantially the form approved in 1998, with some adjustments dating to 2013 to account for
tribal compact schools. 46 That is not likely to change least the next few years—in 2019, voters
rejected a referendum to repeal I-200, though margin was just 20,000 votes. 47
2. 2005’s I-900 and Performance Audits
Initiative 900 (I-900) “direct[ed] the State Auditor to conduct performance audits of state
and local governments.” 48 It passed with 56% of the vote, and since 2007, the Washington State
Auditor has published annual status reports. 49 Although legally uncontroversial, it may have had
an adverse effect on education funding, at least initially. 50
B. The Article II, § 19 Cases
1. The First Overturned Initiative: I-695 and Amalgamated Transit Union
“No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.” 51
Just sixteen words, the Washington Constitution’s Article II, § 19 has given the Supreme Court

43

Id.
Wash. Off. of the Sec’y of State, Elections Search Results: November 1998 General,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/results_report.aspx?e=10&c=&c2=&t=&t2=&p=&p2=&y=.
45
Permanent Offense, Baptism of Fire: My first initiative wasn’t $30 tabs, it was limiting affirmative action,
https://permanentoffense.com/baptism-of-fire-my-first-initiative-wasnt-30-tabs-it-was-limiting-affirmative-action/,
July 6, 2022.
46
RCW 49.60.400.
47
Wash. Off. of the Sec’y of State, November 5, 2019 General Election Results,
https://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20191105/state-measures-referendum-measure-no-88.html.
48
Wash. Off. of the Sec’y of State, Elections Search Results: November 2005 General,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/results_report.aspx?e=4&c=&c2=&t=&t2=&p=&p2=&y=.
49
Wash. Leg., I-900 SAO Reports & Public Hearings, https://leg.wa.gov/jlarc/I-900.
50
Kristen Millares Young, Bill Aims at Paying Audit Costs, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 3, 2008,
https://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Bill-aims-at-paying-audit-costs-1266212.php.
51
Wash. Const. art. II, § 19.
44
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reason to strike down five of Eyman’s initiatives, beginning with 1999’s Initiative 695 (I-695)
and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183, 11 P.3d 762 (2000)
(ATU 587). 52 The ballot title in question read: “Shall voter approval be required for any tax
increase, license tab fees be $30 per year for motor vehicles, and existing vehicle taxes be
repealed?” 53 “Tax,” as defined by the initiative, included “license fees, permit fees, and any
monetary charge by government.” 54 Still, voters approved the measure, seven separate parties
challenged it, and those cases were consolidated (or linked) in King County Superior Court. 55
Judge Robert Alsdorf granted the challengers summary judgement on six grounds, including
violation of Article II, § 19. 56
The State and I-695’s supporters (as intervenors) appealed directly to the Supreme
Court. 57 After dispensing with several motions to dismiss filed by the I-695 campaign as
untimely and not fully briefed, Justice Barbara Madsen noted initiatives are subject to the same
presumption of constitutionality—but also the same constitutional requirements and rules of
statutory construction—as any other law. 58 Consequently, Article II, § 19’s reference to “bill[s]”
applies to initiatives, as does the Court’s rule that the article “is to be liberally construed in favor
of the legislation.” 59

Corrected, Amalgamated Transit Union Loc. 587 v. State, 27 P.3d 608 (Mem. 2001).
Wash. Off. of the Sec’y of State, Elections Search Results: November 1999 General,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/results_report.aspx?e=8&c=&c2=&t=&t2=5&p=&p2=&y=. Eyman’s “$30 car
tab guy” sobriquet dates to this initiative.
54
ATU 587, 142 Wn.2d at 193 (citing Laws of 2000, Ch. 1, § 2(2)).
55
142 Wn.2d at 195, 198.
56
Id. at 198–99.
57
Id. at 199.
58
Id. at 205 (citing Brower v. State, 137 Wn.2d 44, 52, 969 P.2d 42 (1998); Seeber v. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure
Comm’n, 96 Wn.2d 135, 139, 634 P.2d 303 (1981). Curiously, Washington has imposed a “burden of proof,” on the
challenger from the world of criminal law: beyond a reasonable doubt. ATU 587, 142 Wn.2d at 205.
59
Id. at 206.
52
53
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However, those favorable presumptions were not enough to save I-695. To begin, eight
members of the Court found I-695 did embrace more than one subject. 60 The single subject
requirement protects legislators (or here, voters) from “logrolling”: securing votes for an
otherwise unpopular proposal by tying it to an unrelated but popular one. 61 But how the courts
tally the subjects depends on whether the measure’s title is broad or narrow. When a bill or
initiative has a “very broad and comprehensive title”—sometimes called a “general subject”—
the court may find it is constitutional, “even if [the] general subject contains several incidental
subjects or subdivisions.” 62 And “[w]here a general title is used, all that is required is rational
unity between the general subject and the incidental subjects.” 63 By contrast, a “restrictive title,”
i.e. “‘one where a particular part or branch of a subject is carved out and selected as the subject
. . .’ will not be regard as liberally as a general title.” 64 The difference between the two, then,
might be just “a few well-chosen words.” 65
Justice Madsen concluded that I-695’s title was general, based on its plain text. She was
unpersuaded by the defendants’ argument that courts should consider the broader legislative
history and intent but ruled that there was no rational unity between the $30 license fee provision
and the voter tax approval provision. 66 The court analogized I-695 to the toll road act examined
in Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State. 67 There, the title was referred to two provisions in the act:
construction of a specific new toll highway from Seattle to Everett, and procedures for the

Id. at 217.
Id. at 207.
62
Id. at 207–08 (citing numerous examples of general titles from the 1940s to the 1990s).
63
Id. at 209 (citing Kueckelhan, v. Fed. Old Line Ins. Co. (Mut.), 69 Wn.2d 392, 403, 418 P.2d 443 (1966)
(superseded on other grounds by State v. WWJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d 595, 980 P.2d 1257 (1999)).
64
Id. at 210 (quoting State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 127, 942 P.2d 363 (1997).
65
Id. at 209.
66
Id. at 217.
67
Id. at 216 (citing 49 Wn.2d 520, 523–24, 304 P.2d 676 (1956)).
60
61
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construction of other future toll roads. 68 And though the title may have been general, it was
nevertheless ruled unconstitutional. 69 The two purposes described were held not “germane” to
each other because, references to “toll roads” aside, one was “subject to accomplishment” and
one was “continuing in character.” 70 Similarly, I-695’s two provisions were not germane to one
another—one was a “continuing method”; the other was not. 71 “Further, neither subject [was]
necessary to implement the other.” 72
Next, I-695 also failed on subject-in-title grounds, the second prong of Article II, § 19. 73
“The title of an act complies with art. II, § 19 if it gives notice which would lead to an inquiry
into the body of the act or indicates the scope and purpose of the law to an inquiring mind.” 74
And after examining I-695’s peculiar definition of a “tax,” the court found an average voter may
not understand the content of the measure just based on the title. 75 Indeed, “I-695 specifically
define[d] the term tax. It would be unnecessary to define the term if it had its common meaning
. . . .” 76 And because that definition was not made clear in the title itself, the title was
unconstitutional. 77 The “tax” approval section of I-695 was held severable, however. 78
Third, I-695 created an unconstitutional referendum. 79 Article II, § 1(b) of the
Washington Constitution requires a petition signed by four percent of the voters to place a
referendum on the ballot. And Justice Madsen agreed with Judge Alsdorf’s reasoning that I-695,

49 Wn.2d at 521.
Id. at 523–24.
70
Id.
71
142 Wn.2d at 217.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. (citing Wash. Fed’n of State Emp., 127 Wn.2d at 555).
75
Id. at 220.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 226 (citing DeCano v. State, 7 Wn.2d 613, 624, 110 P.2d 627 (1941) (striking down an anti-alien land law
employing a definition of “alien” that was not the “common understanding” of the term)).
78
142 Wn.2d at 229.
79
Id. at 231.
68
69
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by subjecting every new tax, fee, etc. to voter approval, “constitute[d] a presumptive veto, and
establishes a referendum.” 80 Moreover, “[t]he initiative process cannot be used to amend the
constitution” and create a new referendum process. 81 That the legislative power may ultimately
derive from the people was of no consequence, given the people delegated that power to the
legislature in a particular manner described in the constitution. 82
Finally, I-695 ran afoul of Article II, § 37 as well. “No act shall ever be revised or
amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the Section amended shall be set
forth at full length.” 83 Washington courts use two tests to determine a violation of this section:
First the act must “stand alone” as a complete act and be fully understood “without referring to
any other statute or enactment.” 84 Second, the act must not “render erroneous” a “straightforward
determination of the scope of rights or duties under existing statutes”—as Justice Madsen
observed, legislators need to know what they are voting for. 85 The court did recognize some
room for a complete act to “modify, and thus render erroneous, an existing statute,” but in so
doing it cannot deceive the legislators. 86 And here, the voter approval requirement of I-695 was
deceptive, or at least difficult to understand fully as drafted. 87 By way of example, the court

80

Id.
Id. at 232 (citing Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wn.2d 188, 210 n. 11, P.2d 1366 (1998)). The ATU 587 court also
contrasted I-695 universal requirement with one-time statewide voter approval provisions in, e.g., Alabama (In re
Opinions of the Justices, 232 Ala. 60, 166 So. 710 (1936)), New Jersey (Hudspeth v. Swayze, 85 N.J.L. 592, 89 A.
780 (1914)), and Oregon (Marr v. Fisher, 182 Or. 383, 187 P.2d 966 (1947)). 142 Wn.2d at 235.
82
Id. at 239.
83
Wash. Const. art. II, § 37.
84
ATU 587, 142 Wn.2d at 246 (citing State ex rel. Living Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 95 Wn.2d 753, 756, 630 P.2d
925 (1981); Wash. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 93 Wn.2d 37, 40, 604 P.2d 950 (1980)).
85
142 Wn.2d at 246.
86
Id. at 248, 251 (rejecting the plaintiffs’ broad reading of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. King Cnty., 91 Wn.2d 721, 731, 592
P.2d 1108 (1979), that an act must set forth in full any prior statute that is changed in scope and effect.)
87
142 Wn.2d at 253–54. The remaining sections, repealing statutes and implementing $30 car tabs, did satisfy art.
II, § 37. Id. at 255.
81
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compared RCW 53.36.100, “requir[ing] a public vote” for some—but not all—port district
assessments (a tax under I-695), to the sweeping public approval requirement in I-695. 88
The court invalidated I-695 in its entirety due to its numerous constitutional violations,
though Justice Gerry Alexander noted in his concurrence that it could have struck down the
initiative on the single-subject violation alone. 89 Still, $30 tabs lived on, at least for a time. Even
before voters approved I-695, Governor Gary Locke promised to convince the legislature to
lower car tabs. 90 And the legislature did just that in the months before the ATU 587 decision. 91
Eyman, then, secured at least a partial political victory.
2. Single-Subject and Property Taxes: I-722 and City of Burien v. Kiga
The next Eyman initiative to pass was 2000’s Initiative 722 (I-722): “Shall certain 1999
tax and fee increases be nullified, vehicles exempted from property taxes, and property tax
increases (except new construction) limited to 2% annually?” 92 Eyman marketed I-722 to voters
as “Son of 695,” an effort to implement the tax regime struck down the year before in
ATU 587. 93 Again, numerous plaintiffs (mostly cities and municipal corporations) challenged the
measure, and again the cases were consolidated, this time in Thurston County in City of Burien v.
Kiga. 94 After oral argument, the trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding

Id. at 253–54.
Id. at 257.
90
Jim Lynch, Locke Vows a Car-Tax Overhaul, Seattle Times, Oct. 15, 1999, at A1.
91
142 Wn.2d at 200; David Postman, Dionne Searcey, and Jim Brunner, I-695 Ruling Saves $30 Tabs, Sets Off
Scramble in Olympia, Seattle Times, Mar. 15, 2000, at A1.
92
Wash. Off. of the Sec’y of State, Elections Search Results: November 2000 General,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/results_report.aspx?e=20&c=&c2=&t=&t2=&p=&p2=&y=.
93
No on I-722 — Times Editorial Endorsements, Seattle Times, October 16, 2000, at B6.
94
144 Wn.2d 819, 823, 31 P.3d 659 (2001).
88
89
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I-722 unconstitutional, but not on the primary grounds raised by the plaintiffs: Article II, § 19. 95
Both the state and initiative sponsors appealed. 96
The court began as, it did in ATU 587, with a ballot title analysis, again noting that
initiatives are bound by the same rules as any other legislation. 97 And like I-695, I-722’s title was
general: “While there are some parts of the title that may appear restrictive, when read in its
entirety the title broadly encompasses the topic of tax relief.” 98 Since the title was general, the
next step under ATU 587 was to examine the rational unity of any subdivisions, i.e. “whether the
matters within the body of the initiative are germane to the general title and whether they are
germane to one another.” 99 Much like I-695, I-722 failed this test. Justice Charles Johnson found
“at least two purposes” in the text of the initiative: (1) a repeal of property tax hikes in 1999, and
(2) a new property tax assessment mechanism. 100 Although both were germane to the general
topic, they were not germane to each other—a one-time repeal and refund of a tax does not bear
one way or the other on “permanent, systemic changes in property tax assessments.” 101 Indeed,
Justice Johnson called out I-722’s flaws more explicitly than ATU 587’s criticism of I-695,
writing, “The kind of logrolling of unrelated measures embodied in I-722 violates the
fundamental principle embedded in article II, section 19 . . . .” 102 In effect, I-722 denied voters
“an opportunity to cast a vote that clearly demonstrated their support for either or both
subjects.” 103

Id. at 824. The Superior Court ruled that I-722 was an unconstitutional tax exemption under Wash. Const. art.
VIII, § 1, and an unconstitutional gift of public funds or property under art. VIII, §§ 5 and 7. Appellant’s Br. 10.
96
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Justice Johnson did not reach any other issues, following Justice Alexander’s
recommendation in his ATU 587 concurrence that single-subject grounds alone invalidate an
initiative. 104 Perhaps the court suspected it would not be the last time it would have to rule on
Eyman’s work, and saw good reason to streamline the process. Months before the court struck
down I-722 in City of Burien (in November of 2001), Eyman had secured a spot for another
property tax initiative on that year’s ballot, Initiative 747 (I-747). 105 And other branches of state
government were suspicious of Eyman’s work as well: The state Department of Revenue advised
county assessors to “ignore” I-722 in December of 2000. 106 If when he wrote City of Burien
Justice Johnson suspected the court would revisit § 19 as applied to an Eyman initiative. . . he
was right.
3. $30 Tabs Return: I-776, the Pierce County Cases, and an Impairment of Contracts
Wrinkle
The state legislature may have reduced car tabs in response to I-695, but Sound Transit
continued to collect its own local voter-approved motor vehicle excise tax to fund, among other
things, light rail construction. 107 Eyman expressed his displeasure by sponsoring Initiative 776
(I-776), passed by the voters in 2002. 108 As the ballot title suggested, I-776 was a more pointed
attack on regional transit authorities: “Initiative Measure No. 776 concerns state and local
government charges on motor vehicles. This measure would require license tab fees to be $30
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Justices Toss Out Eyman Tax Initiative, Seattle Times, Sep. 21, 2001, at B1. See discussion of I-747 supra pp.
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per year for motor vehicles, including light trucks. Certain local-option vehicle excise taxes and
fees used for roads and transit would be repealed.” 109
Pierce County and others sued in King County Superior Court, where then-Judge Mary
Yu granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on two grounds: “(1) that I–776 violated article
II, section 19 of the state constitution . . . ; and (2) that I–776 violated article I, section 23 of the
state constitution because I–776's repeal of a $15 motor vehicle fee impaired King County's
obligations to its bondholders.” 110 The Supreme Court considered the ballot title issue in “Pierce
County I.” 111 And on that issue, for the first time with an Eyman-backed initiative, the
defendants prevailed. 112 Justice Susan Owens did not draw any general versus restrictive
distinction, instead moving directly to the rational unity test. 113 But with I-776, the court faced an
issue of first impression: whether “precatory provision[s]” expressing a policy goal can create
separate subjects or are mere “fluff.” 114 Writing for the six-justice majority, Justice Owens
concluded that “policy expressions in a bill or initiative do not contribute additional ‘subjects’
within the meaning of article II, section 19.” 115 “‘A law is a rule of action. An argument is
not. . . .’” 116 Because the remaining language in I-776 was all rationally related to lowering car
tabs to $30, it satisfied Article II, § 19’s single-subject requirement. 117
Next, the court considered the subject-in-title requirement. Unlike I-695 and I-722, I776’s title was drafted according to statutory guidelines substantially similar to today’s RCW
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Id.
Pierce Cnty. v. State, 150 Wn.2d 422, 428, 78 P.3d 640 (2003) (Pierce County I).
111
Id.
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Id. at 431.
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system.
115
Id. at 433.
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Id. at 434 (quoting State ex. rel. Berry. V. Sup. Ct. for Thurston Cnty., 92 Wash. 16, 30–32, 159 P. 92 (1916)).
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29.A.72.050. The clear expression of the subject required in the first sentence, followed by the
second sentence’s description of the initiative’s operative sections, had “no constitutional
defect.” 118 Given the precatory sections were not subjects, it did not matter that the title made no
mention of them. 119
The court also found for the defendants against King County on an impairment of
contracts issue. “No . . . law impairing the obligations of contracts shall ever be passed.” 120
Justice Owens granted that the county had pledged its $15 vehicle excise tax when issuing its
bonds, but also noted that it had pledged its “full faith and credit.” 121 In other words, King
County had promised to make good on its debts regardless of the effects of I-776. 122 Thus, I-776
could not impair its contracting ability. 123 The court then remanded the case to Superior Court,
for further proceedings, including a challenge by Sound Transit that had been postponed pending
the outcome of the Article II, § 19 challenge. 124
Sound Transit was renewed its challenge on remand, arguing that the initiative impaired
its ability to contract. 125And they were confident of its odds of success: Sound Transit Chair (and
King County Executive) Ron Sims announced the transit authority would continue to collect its
fees, at which point Eyman started what observers described as a “shouting match.” 126 Sure
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enough, the trial court found for Sound Transit, and the Supreme Court reviewed I-776 once
more in Pierce County II. 127
Laws interfering with public contracts, like Sound Transit’s, are subject to greater
scrutiny than laws interfering with private contracts. 128 “[The Washington Supreme Court] uses a
three-part test to determine if there has been an impairment of public contract: (1) does a
contractual relationship exist, (2) does the legislation substantially impair the contractual
relationship, and (3) if there is substantial impairment, is it reasonable and necessary to serve a
legitimate public purpose.” 129
There was no question the bonds Sound Transit had issued in 1998 to fund its mass
transit projects were contracts. 130 And I-776 impaired those contracts: They were secured in
large part by Sound Transit’s ability to levy a motor vehicle excise tax. 131 Justice Madsen
compared I-776 to Ruano, in which an initiative targeting repealing a hotel tax was held
unconstitutional because it would have impaired King County’s ability to honor the bonds issued
to build the Kingdome. 132 Finally, “[the] impairment is substantial because it detrimentally
affects the financial framework which induced the bondholders to purchase the bonds, without
providing alternative or additional security.” 133 Even if Sound Transit had alternative revenue
streams, and even if the market for those bonds remained strong, repealing the excise tax was a
substantial change in circumstances from the ones under which the bondholders bought the

Id. at 22, 27.
Id. at 28 (citing Tyrpak v. Daniels, 124 Wn.2d 146, 151, 874 P.2d 1374 (1994).
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bonds. 134 And there is no balancing the public’s desire for an initiative against the contract
clause—whether it was popular or not I-776 was unconstitutional. 135
The intervening defendants (homeowners within Sound Transit’s boundaries and
Permanent Offense, Eyman’s political action committee) made a last-ditch argument that the
bonds themselves were invalid. 136 Ironically enough, it was a single-subject argument that the
statutory amendment authorizing the formation of Sound Transit without a referendum—part of
a 1993 appropriations bill—was a separate subject. 137 But the intervening appellants, a
homeowners association within Sound Transit’s boundaries, “fail[ed] to recognize that the
legislature’s 1994 amendment . . . superseded the 1993 act.” 138 Because that 1994 bill was
uncontested under Article II, § 19, there was no constitutional issue with the 1998 bonds. 139
Justice Madsen had still less patience for the intervenors’ argument that the 1994 act violated
Article II, § 37 by including the full text of the 1993 statute rather than the 1992 statute: “Since
the 1994 legislature was entitled to assume that the 1993 act was constitutional, the legislature
properly complied with article II, section 37.” 140
Additional claims brought by the intervenors and rejected by the court included:
(1) That, like a city or county, Sound Transit’s formation required a vote of the public
under Wash. Const. art. XI, § 10; 141
(2) That Sound Transit is somehow is an attempt by the state to legislate indirectly
mass transit; 142

Id. at 35–37 (citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. N.J., 431 U.S. 1, 18, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1977)).
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(3) That the Sound Transit Board’s existence interferes with the right to vote under
Wash. Const. art I, § 19; 143
(4) That Sound Transit is an improper delegation of state taxing power; 144 and
(5) That ordering Sound Transit to retire its bonds prematurely was an appropriate
remedy for I-776’s impairment of contracting. 145
With that, I-776’s attempt to cripple Sound Transit failed. Eyman may have demonstrated
he could draft an initiative that was confined to a single subject, but if anything, the effort may
have further entrenched Sound Transit’s taxing power—Attorney General Rob McKenna had
argued the court should only permit the repealed tax to the extent it paid off the bonds, but the
court went further. 146 After Pierce County II, the prospects for Eyman’s $30 tabs were much
grimmer.
4. The Sales Tax: I-1366 and Lee v. State
Roughly a decade after I-776 was overturned, Eyman tried his hand at a sales tax
initiative. Its ballot title read as follows:
Initiative Measure No. 1366 [I-1366] concerns state taxes and fees. This measure
would decrease the sales tax rate unless the legislature refers to voters a
constitutional amendment requiring two-thirds legislative approval or voter
approval to raise taxes, and legislative approval for fee increases.” 147

Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 43–45 (“Initially, we observe that intervenors do not even mention our lengthy discussion in Larson v.
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That is, I-1366 included a sales tax reduction contingent on the legislature not proposing
a constitutional amendment. After a failed attempt to keep I-1366 off the ballot, 148 the
measure passed with about 52% of the vote. 149
I-1366 was then challenged in King County, where Judge William Downing held that it
violated Article II, § 19. 150 In Judge Downing’s words, “It is impossible to determine how many
people voted for this initiative because they desired adoption of the constitutional amendment at
its heart and how many voted for it because they desired the short-term relief of the immediate
reduction in the sales tax.” 151 The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. 152 While there was no
dispute that I-1366 had a general title, but, as with I-695 in ATU 587 and I-722 in City of Burien,
that was of no moment: whether the general subject was “taxes” or “fiscal restraint,” the specific
sales tax provision was wholly unrelated to the constitutional amendment provision, both
because the amendment would have affected all future taxes and because it was a constitutional
amendment. 153 The state argued the constitutional amendment provision was mere “policy fluff”
under Pierce County I, but Chief Justice Madsen was quick to point out that the language was
contingent, and the sales tax reduction incentivized the legislature to act on the proposed
amendment. 154
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Nor was I-1366 valid contingent legislation. When the court had upheld contingent
legislation in the past, the legislation was contingent on “an operative set of facts outside the
legislation itself,” and those facts were “closely related to the proposed law.” 155 By contrast, I1366 created a legislative contingency immediately—the sales tax reduction—and that
contingency had “no nexus” to the constitutional amendment. 156 “[C]alling [I-1366] ‘contingent
legislation’ does nothing to cure its constitutional defects.” 157
Finally, the court also found I-1366 an improper constitutional amendment under Article
XXIII of the Washington Constitution.
“Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either
branch of the legislature; and if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of the
members elected to each of the two houses, such proposed amendment or
amendments shall be . . . submitted to the qualified electors of the state for their
approval . . . .” 158
By forcing the legislature to propose a particular amendment—a “‘do this or else’ structure,” as
Chief Justice Madsen phrased it—I-1366 created a new amendment process. 159 The initiative
was thus struck down without a single dissenting justice, but Justice Gonzalez did write a
concurrence (joined by Justices Gordon McCloud and Yu) arguing that the court did not need to
reach the single-subject issue—Article XXIII was “[t]he most direct, simple and clear way” to
strike down I-1366. 160 Still, the court covered all its bases.
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5. Still More Car Tabs: I-976 and Garfield County
Eyman presented $30 car tabs to the voters one more time with 2019’s Initiative 976 (I976). This time, the wrinkle was how car tabs would be calculated going forward:
“Initiative Measure No. 976 concerns motor vehicle taxes and fees. This measure
would repeal, reduce or remove authority to impose certain vehicle taxes and fees;
limit annual motor-vehicle-license fees to $30, except voter-approved changes;
and base vehicle taxes on Kelly Blue Book value.” 161
It passed. 162 It was challenged. 163 And on direct review by the Supreme Court, it was struck
down for violating Article II, § 19. 164
Justice Steven Gonzalez summarized the court’s twenty years of § 19 jurisprudence,
returning to ATU 587’s general-restrictive and rational unity framework. 165 One section of I-976,
“requir[ing] Sound transit to retire, defease, or refinance bonds,” was unambiguously a second
subject, unrelated to the general subject of “limiting vehicle taxes and fees.” 166 The title was also
misleading. 167 Rather than preserve previously approved fees, as the “average-informed voter”
would read the ballot title, I-976 actually eliminated them. 168 The second subject and misleading
ballot title were sufficient to strike down the initiative in its entirety, without reaching any other
issues. 169
Despite some rumblings from Republican legislators about a new $30 car tab bill, the
concept has not gained the traction it had in 1999. 170 Sound Transit’s excise tax seems here to
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stay, at least through 2028. 171 And so too does the Supreme Court’s insistence that initiative
sponsors follow Article II, § 19.
C. The Supermajority Initiatives and League of Educ. Voters
Three related initiatives over five years—Initiatives 960 (I-960), 1053 (I-1053), and 1185
(I-1185)—all addressed the same supermajority requirement for tax increases, and all were
struck down in League of Education Voters v. State. 172
In 2007, the voters approved I-960, 173 which “require[d] two-thirds legislative approval
or voter approval for tax increases, legislative approval of fee increases, certain published
information on tax-increasing bills, and advisory votes on taxes enacted without voter
approval.” 174 A local nonprofit and union had tried to keep I-960 off the ballot entirely, but the
Supreme Court unanimously held “[s]uch a challenge is not subject to preelection review.” 175
After it passed, State Senator Lisa Brown tried to rein in the scope of I-960 by challenging the
Lieutenant Governor’s finding that a bill was subject to the new two-thirds majority; that too
failed on ripeness grounds. 176 Finally, in 2010, the legislature voted (along party lines with
Democrats in favor) to suspend I-960 for sixteen months. 177
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In response, Eyman and his allies leveraged Article II, § 1 of the State Constitution, and
placed I-1053 on the 2010 ballot. 178 I-1053—essentially a new vote on I-960’s supermajority
requirement—restarted the two-year clock during which initiatives can only be amended or
repealed by a two-thirds majority of the legislature, which meant it could not be suspended like
I-960. 179 The vote was overwhelming: 64% to 36%. Of course, had the legislature just waited
two years, it could have suspended I-1053 as well. So two years later, Eyman reset the clock
again with I-1185; it passed with 64% approval as well. 180
When an education funding bill failed to pass by a bare majority, the League of
Education Voters and several legislators challenged all three initiatives. 181 The key constitutional
issue was whether the supermajority requirement was at odds with Article II, § 22: “No bill shall
become a law unless on its final passage . . . a majority of the members elected to each house be
recorded thereon as voting in its favor.” 182 In defending the initiatives, the State argued § 22,
because it is phrased in the negative, merely sets the floor, but Justice Owens (writing for five of
her colleagues) rejected that reasoning—the phrasing must be placed in context. 183
And the context did not favor the state. For one, “[t]he seven supermajority requirements
in the original constitution were all relegated to special circumstances, not the passage of
ordinary legislation.” 184 For another, a review of the historical record—the framers debated the
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language of § 22 and chose to include the majority requirement, but exclude any phrase that
would give the legislature more discretion—suggests a bare majority was intended to be both the
floor and the ceiling for ordinary legislation. 185 And other states have read similar provisions in
their constitution to be restrictive as well, from Alaska to California. 186 The supermajority
requirement was therefore unconstitutional, though the court did make a point of not criticizing
the initiatives on the merits. 187
In his dissent, though, Justice Charles Johnson expressed concern that the majority was
too quick to “embroil itself in the political arena” and should have found the controversy
nonjusticiable. 188 For his part, Justice James Johnson was concerned that “a court of nine people
(actually only six votes) is imposing their policy preference over that of the 1,575,655 voters
. . . .” 189 And he questioned the majority’s view of the historical record, arguing that the
supermajority requirements present in the constitution did open the door to additional restrictions
via initiative, not the other way around. 190 But a political ruling or not, it is no longer
constitutional to mandate a legislative supermajority absent a constitutional amendment.
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D. The Court Revisits § 37: I-747 and Wash. Citizens Action
The court’s internal disagreements over political optics in initiative cases also spilled
over in Washington Citizens Action of Washington v. State, in which it struck down 2001’s I747. 191 Just a few weeks after the preliminary injunction against I-722 taking effect, 192 Eyman
sponsored a new property tax initiative: I-747. 193 But in incorporating the statute it sought to
amend—as required by Article II, § 37—I-747 referenced I-722’s two-percent cap on property
tax increases, not the six-percent cap in place prior to the approval of I-722. 194 Thurston County
Superior Court’s “permanent injunction [of I-722] took effect more than four months before
voter signatures [for I-747] were due to the secretary of state.” 195 On September 20, 2001, the
Supreme Court struck down I-722 in City of Burien; on November 6, 2001, the voters approved
I-747. 196
In a five-to-four decision (with Justice Bridge writing for the majority), the court
concluded that because I-747 incorporated a law ruled unconstitutional before election day, the
initiative text did not “accurately set forth the law to be amended.” 197 Refining Pierce County II,
the court set the “legislative action at which compliance with article II, section 37 is required” at
the time of voting, not the time of filing. 198 Putting the voters on notice that I-747 might amend
the law as it stood before I-722 was not enough—because “many voters do not read the Voters’
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Pamphlet,” the law itself must be “‘set forth at full length.’” 199 Conceding that there is no
amendment process after an initiative is filed, Justice Bridge proposed that initiative sponsors
should refile if there is a need to amend the text based on a post-filing court decision. 200
Although onerous, in the rare cases where that would be required, the majority thought it
worthwhile to “protect the electorate . . . from being misled.” 201
Justice Charles Johnson (and three others) were not convinced. “No reasonable argument
can be sustained that voters were in any way misled or confused by the effect of I–747, which
expressly and was specifically aimed at lowering the tax growth to one percent”; to suggest
otherwise insulted the voters’ intelligence. 202 A reference to a two-percent cap rather than a sixpercent cap, when I-747 was proposing a one-percent cap on property taxes regardless, was not
misleading. 203 In essence, the court split over how astute the average Washington voter is more
than the text of the constitution itself: five thought voters required more information, while four
did not.
III. Takeaways from Twenty Years of Initiatives
Whether Eyman will sponsor another initiative is an open question—he has other
concerns now. 204 But his initiatives have left something of a constitutional legacy. First, stick to
one subject. Whether or not Mr Eyman himself has learned (or wishes to learn) that lesson,
others have: “Let’s Go Washington,” a Redmond-based political action committee, has
sponsored eleven separate initiatives for the next election cycle, rather than trying to consolidate
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their policy proposals into one or two. 205 Second, the legislature itself responded to the spike in
initiatives by refining the law on ballot titles—today’s requirements are much more prescriptive,
and therefore more consistent, than they were in 1999. 206
Eyman might say his legacy is revealing “corruption” on the Supreme Court. 207 But there
is little evidence of that. I-200 and I-900 are still on the books, as are some sections of his other
initiatives. More broadly, jurists nationwide seem to rule on single-subject cases based on how
many subjects are included in the law regardless of the law’s substance. 208 True, Washington’s
court has sometimes been at loggerheads over how much respect to grant the average voter, as in
League of Educ. Voters and Wash. Citizens Action, or on how many grounds it should rule. But it
did not draft the initiatives it struck down—Eyman did.
Despite not sponsoring any recent initiatives (and now owing the state millions), Eyman
still looms large over the initiative process, and still inspires editorials both for and against his
work. 209 But if aspiring initiative sponsors stay focused—and read the Constitution—they can, as
many Washingtonians have in the past whose names never made the papers, not just sway the
voters, but effect lasting change in state law.
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Appendix: Eyman-Sponsored Initiatives that Qualified for the Ballot
Year

Ballot Title

1998

I-200

1999

I-695

2000

I-722

2000

I-745

2001

I-747

2002

I-776

2004

I-892

2005

I-900

Shall government be prohibited from
discriminating or granting preferential
treatment based on race, sex, color, ethnicity,
or national origin in public employment,
education and contracting?
Shall voter approval be required for any tax
increase, license tab fees be $30 per year for
motor vehicles, and existing vehicle taxes be
repealed?
Shall certain 1999 tax and fee increases be
nullified, vehicles exempted from property
taxes, and property tax increases (except new
construction) limited to 2% annually?
Shall 90% of transportation funds, including
transit taxes, be spent for roads; transportation
agency performance audits required; and road
construction and maintenance be sales taxexempt?
Initiative Measure No. 747 concerns limiting
property tax increases. This measure would
require state and local governments to limit
property tax levy increases to 1% per year,
unless an increase greater than this limit is
approved by the voters at an election.
Initiative Measure No. 776 concerns state and
local government charges on motor vehicles.
This measure would require license tab fees to
be $30 per year for motor vehicles, including
light trucks. Certain local-option vehicle excise
taxes and fees used for roads and transit would
be repealed.
Initiative Measure No. 892 concerns
authorizing additional “electronic scratch
ticket machines” to reduce property taxes. This
measure would authorize licensed non-tribal
gambling establishments to operate the same
type and number of machines as tribal
governments, with a portion of tax revenue
generated used to reduce state property taxes.
Initiative Measure No. 900 concerns
performance audits of governmental entities.
This measure would direct the State Auditor to
conduct performance audits of state and local
governments, and dedicate 0.16% of the state’s
portion of sales and use tax collections to fund
these audits.
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Election
Result
Approved

Subsequent
History
Codified as RCW
49.60.400

Approved

Overturned in
Amalgamated Transit
Union Loc. 587 v. State,
142 W.2d 183, 11 P.3d 762
(2000)
Overturned in City of
Burien v. Kiga, 144 Wn.2d
819, 31 P.3d 659 (2001)

Approved

Rejected

Approved

Overturned in Wash.
Citizens Action of Wash. v.
State, 162 Wn.2d 142, 171
P.3d 486 (2007)

Approved

Overturned in Pierce
County v. State, 159 Wn.2d
16, 148 P.3d 1002 (2006)
(Pierce County II)

Rejected

Approved

Codified as RCW
43.09.470

Year

Ballot Title

2007

I-960

2008

I-985

2009

I-1033

2010

I-1053

2011

I-1125

2012

I-1185

Initiative Measure No. 960 concerns tax and
fee increases imposed by state government.
This measure would require two-thirds
legislative approval or voter approval for tax
increases, legislative approval of fee increases,
certain published information on taxincreasing bills, and advisory votes on taxes
enacted without voter approval.
Initiative Measure No. 985 concerns
transportation. This measure would open highoccupancy vehicle lanes to all traffic during
specified hours, require traffic light
synchronization, increase roadside assistance
funding, and dedicate certain taxes, fines, tolls
and other revenues to traffic-flow purposes.
Initiative Measure No. 1033 concerns state,
county and city revenue. Initiative Measure No.
1033 concerns state, county and city revenue.
This measure would limit growth of certain
state, county and city revenue to annual
inflation and population growth, not including
voter-approved revenue increases. Revenue
collected above the limit would reduce
property tax levies.
Initiative Measure No. 1053 concerns tax and
fee increases imposed by state government.
This measure would restate existing statutory
requirements that legislative actions raising
taxes must be approved by two-thirds
legislative majorities or receive voter
approval, and that new or increased fees
require majority legislative approval.
Initiative Measure No. 1125 concerns state
expenditures on transportation. This measure
would prohibit the use of motor vehicle fund
revenue and vehicle toll revenue for nontransportation purposes, and require that road
and bridge tolls be set by the legislature and be
project-specific.
Initiative Measure No. 1185 concerns tax and
fee increases imposed by state government.
This measure would restate existing statutory
requirements that legislative actions raising
taxes must be approved by two-thirds
legislative majorities or receive voter
approval, and that new or increased fees
require majority legislative approval.
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Election
Result
Approved

Subsequent
History
Suspended by the state
legislature, then largely
overturned in League of
Educ. Voters v. State, 176
Wn.2d 808, 295 P.3d 743
(2013)

Rejected

Rejected

Approved

Overturned in League of
Educ. Voters, 176 Wn.2d

Rejected

Approved

Overturned in League of
Educ. Voters, 176 Wn.2d

Year

Ballot Title

2013

I-517

2015

I-1366

2019

I-976

Initiative Measure No. 517 concerns initiative
and referendum measures. This measure would
set penalties for interfering with or retaliating
against signature-gatherers and petitionsigners; require that all measures receiving
sufficient signatures appear on the ballot; and
extend time for gathering initiative petition
signatures.
Initiative Measure No. 1366 concerns state
taxes and fees. This measure would decrease
the sales tax rate unless the legislature refers
to voters a constitutional amendment requiring
two-thirds legislative approval or voter
approval to raise taxes, and legislative
approval for fee increases.
Initiative Measure No. 976 concerns motor
vehicle taxes and fees. This measure would
repeal, reduce, or remove authority to impose
certain vehicle taxes and fees; limit annual
motor-vehicle-license fees to $30, except voterapproved charges; and base vehicle taxes on
Kelley Blue Book value.
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Election
Result
Rejected

Subsequent
History

Approved

Overturned in Lee v. State,
185 Wn.2d 608, 374 P.3d
157 (2016)

Approved

Overturned in Garfield
Cnty. Transp. Auth. v.
State, 196 Wn.2d 378, 473
P.3d 1205 (2020)

